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Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- Introduction -- 1 The Family-Work Nexus and Wellbeing in Asia: An Introduction -- Abstract -- 1.1 The Experiences of Work-Family Life -- 1.2 Work Organizations' Response to Work-Family Concerns -- 1.3 Work-Life Conflict and Impact on Wellbeing -- 1.4 State Policy Support for Working Parents -- 1.5 The Intersection of Family, Work and Wellbeing: A Summary of Chapters -- 1.6 Looking Ahead -- References -- Family Structure -- 2 Familial Exchange and Intergenerational Contact in East Asian Societies -- Abstract -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Intergenerational Ties in Exchange Perspective -- 2.3 Hypothesis -- 2.4 Data and Method -- 2.5 Measurement -- 2.6 Result and Analysis -- 2.7 Robustness Check -- 2.8 Conclusions -- References -- 3 A New Era in Living Arrangements: Determinants of Quality of Life Among Chinese Older Adults -- Abstract -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Trends of Chinese Older Adults' Living Arrangements -- 3.3 Determinants of Chinese Older Adults' Living Arrangements -- 3.4 Influence of Living Arrangement on Older Adults' Quality of Life -- 3.5 The Present Study -- 3.6 Methods -- 3.7 Measures -- 3.8 Analytic Strategies -- 3.9 Results -- 3.10 Discussion -- 3.11 Trends of Empty-Nest Families and the Heterogeneity of Empty-Nest Older Adults -- 3.12 The Influence of Filial Piety on Living Arrangements -- 3.13 The Influence of Socioeconomic Status on Living Arrangements -- 3.14 Not Living with Children Does not Always Predict Disadvantages for Elders -- 3.15 Living Only with a Spouse Does not Differ from Living with Children for Quality of Life -- 3.16 Limitations -- 3.17 Policy Implications -- 3.18 Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- Appendix -- References -- Gender, Work and Culture -- 4 Multiple Dimensions of Gender-Role Attitudes: Diverse Patterns Among Four East-Asian Societies.

A great number of women from China, Vietnam, and Indonesia recently arrived in Taiwan to marry men of lower social strata. Such an unusual pattern of migration has stimulated debates about the status and the citizenship of the new arrivals. This study analyzes Taiwanese responses toward these marriage migrants by using a national survey conducted in 2004. Three aspects of restrictive attitudes were tapped concerning these newcomers: (1) rights to work; (2) access to public health insurance; and (3) full citizenship. Immigrants from China were most opposed, compared to women with other origins (Southeast Asia, Japan, Europe, and the US). The seemingly unrelated regression estimation regression results do not support the split labor market hypotheses, as marriage migrants do not appear to be economic threats toward members of the lower classes. In contrast, ethnic nationalism plays a key role in determining the natives' restrictive attitudes. The case of Taiwan represents a special genre, where ethnic politics selectively arouses the social rejection of women immigrants of certain origins.

Abstract.  Despite the considerable progress of human development (HD) in developing countries (DCs) during recent decades, vast differences still remain among such countries. The question thus arises of why these divergences persist. This cross‐national study uses a larger sample of DCs to offer necessary testing of the impact of democracy on HD. This study adopts new measures of democracy featuring majority rule and political contention to estimate their correlation with three physical well‐being indicators as well as with three school enrollment indicators. After controlling for several macro‐level political and economic characteristics (state revenue and economic growth), the regression modeling for recent data from the 1980s and 1990s showed that democracies indeed achieved higher levels on the HD indicators used here. However, democracy was not a powerful predictor of changes in HD scores during the analysis period. Neither central government health or educational spending significantly altered HD. The conclusions offer a plausible explanation of why democracy in DCs failed to sustain its momentum in improving HD.

The current debate on Taiwan's development has been dominated by the statist perspective that identifies state power as a key to its growth miracle. The paper challenges this statist idea. By analyzing the evolving process of the developmental state from a predatory government in the 1950s and early 1960s, the authors argue that the imposing of constraints on the despotic power of the state constitutes a key mechanism by which a balanced power structure between the state and capital is formed and the private sector can develop and benefit from policy incentives. The taming of a Leviathan state and the shift from a war economy toward a developmental regime were a result of strong U.S. geopolitical intervention. (DSE/DÜI)

In this article, we test the prevailing statist argument about the state's contribution to economic development in less-developed countries (LDCs). State power in terms of centralized control of societal resources has been long considered a primary factor for economic growth. From the embeddedness perspective, the state's effective embedding in the economy advances productive growth, while state power actually operates as a structural precondition of such policy action. Featured in our measurement are representative & financial embeddedness (operationalized as the central government's tax income & its lending to the private sector & local states, respectively). The empirical testing is based on pooled cross-national data of 61 underdeveloped countries. As indicated from modeling both manufacturing growth & increases in GNP per capita as dependent variables (during the period 1975-1990), the state power variable does not produce expected growth outcomes. However, two embedded state measures display significant but sector-biased growth effects only for manufacturing production. Herein, we further compare strong state power countries with weak ones, concluding that state power serves as a structural prerequisite so that late industrialization for LDCs can benefit from the growth coalitions in which the central state collaborates with (rather than dominates) actors at the subnational level of society & authorities. 4 Tables, 83 References. Adapted from the source document.